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Abstract 
This master thesis investigates PSV term charter freight rates in the offshore industry. Fixtures 
in Brazil and the North Sea from 2004-2015 are examined. The offshore markets and term 
structure of freight rates are presented and discussed. Thereafter, the data and determinants of 
the freight rates are analyzed and later optimized. We find that both vessel and contract specific 
properties are significant determinants of the freight rate. Macro determinants are also found 
to be key variables in determination of the freight rate. Further, the periods before and after 
2009 are compared in the analysis to identify whether the freight rate determination have 
changed during the last decade.  
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1. Introduction 
Offshore markets are a relatively fresh field of research. Finding relevant literature on the 
industry has been a difficult task, but has encouraged us to contribute to the field. We have 
been inspired by similar studies done in shipping and wanted to conduct similar research in 
offshore supply.   
The petroleum industry is Norway’s most important industry and the oil price development is 
a big part of the news. Norway’s oil revenues and investments are decreasing and have put 
pressure on the petroleum industry to become more cost-efficient. With the offshore industry 
on the agenda more than ever we find it interesting to investigate the largest income source for 
oilfield service companies, the freight rates.  
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the determinants of freight rates paid for a Platform 
Supply Vessel (PSV). This has, as far as we know, never been researched empirically before. 
Our hypothesis is that there exist a relationship between vessel specifications and realized term 
contract freight rates. We also hypothesize that macro variables determine most of the term 
freight rates, and that contract specific elements explain the freight rate to a varying extent.  
The last research question we have examined, is whether the determinants of freight rates has 
changed in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008. 
We have discussed freight rate determination thoroughly with market participants such as 
shipbrokers, oil companies and ship-owners. A common understanding among the market 
players is that vessel specifications determine a part of the term charter freight rates in the 
offshore supply market. 
From a ship-owners’ point of view, information concerning the role of vessel and duty specific 
factors in determination of freight rates can be used in strategic planning of operations and 
investments. Charterers can make use of information regarding when to hire a certain vessel 
and which vessel specifications a chartered vessel should have. 
This thesis is divided into 8 chapters. A brief overview of relevant literature is presented in 
chapter 2. The offshore market is introduced in chapter 3. Chapter 4 will present the model 
and method used to analyze our data. The data is presented and described in chapter 5. Chapter 
6 contains our analysis and findings. Chapter 7 points out criticism and limitations to the 
findings while chapter 8 concludes. 
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2. Literature review 
Shipping freight rates have been investigated carefully in the past. Their seasonality patterns, 
volatility and term structure have been established as well as the macroeconomic determinants 
of shipping freight rates. While aggregate macro forecasts of freight rates can be argued to be 
useful for medium to long term investments, ship-owners and charterers could benefit from 
micro forecasts for making operational decisions, budgets and cash flow predictions.  
However, the literature on microeconomic determinants of shipping freight is somewhat 
limited. Tamvakis and Thanopoulou (2000) found no significant difference between freight 
rates in the time period 1989-1996 for newer versus older vessels when investigating the 
existence of a two-tier dry-bulk ship charter market. Yet, in a more recent study Köhn and 
Thanopoluou (2011) finds that differences in freight rates for old and modern vessels are 
significant over a longer and more recent period. Vessel and voyage determinants of freight 
rates and contract times are investigated in Alizadeh and Talley (2011a) and Alizadeh and 
Talley (2011b) in dry bulk- and tanker markets respectively, using a system of simultaneous 
equations. For both shipping segments, freight rates are found to be positively related to the 
laycan1 period and a simultaneous relationship exists between them. The laycan periods of 
freight contracts vary directly with freight rates and indirectly with freight rate volatility. 
Freight rates are positively related to the size of bulk ships, and single-hull tankers are traded 
at a discount. Freight rates and laycan periods also found to vary across shipping routes.  
 
Similarly, the master thesis by Riise and Rødde (2014) tries to identify quality related aspects 
of freight rate determinants and existence of a quality premium in the dry bulk market from 
2001-2014. They identify a non-linear relationship between the variables and support for 
quality segmentation with respect to age and size. They also find that there has been a shift in 
market dynamics in time periods before and after 2008.  
Offshore freight rate research is a different story however. Bjørkelund (2014) empirically 
analyzes spot freight rate characteristics in the North Sea for both Anchor Handling Tug 
Supply (AHTS) vessels and PSVs and proposes a model to capture the market dynamics. 
                                                 
1 The laycan period is the length of the period between the fixture and start date. 
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As far as we know, there has been no attempt to empirically analyze the term charter freight 
rates by studying their determinants. This is probably due to very limited data availability. 
After having obtained sufficient micro level data per fixture, we are able to analyze each 
specific term fixture for PSVs in both the North Sea and Brazil.  
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3. The offshore markets 
Downstream logistics is defined as bringing oil and gas onshore while upstream logistics is 
defined as the supply of offshore installations (Aas et al., 2009). In order to operate from 
remote locations, offshore platforms and rigs need to be supported regularly by specialized 
vessels. Oil companies do not own these vessels, but charters them from ship-owners on 
contracts with different lengths. The hiring of these vessels is a large cost component in the 
upstream logistics for the oil companies.  
Optimization of the upstream logistics is called the vehicle routing problem. It will not be 
examined in this thesis, but is investigated and discussed in papers such as Azi et al. (2010), 
Halvorsen-Weare et al. (2012), Fagerholt and Lindstad (2000) and Brandão and Mercer 
(1997). Some important aspects are worth mentioning however. If the routing of vessels is 
poorly planned, installations would tie up more vessels and capacity than necessary, which 
drives unnecessary costs for the oil companies. Poor vessel routing may lead to high utilization 
of the current fleet, and thereby increased order books for new vessels as ship-owners believe 
the market is stronger than it actually is. However, this is economically inefficient since the 
required capacity with an optimized routing is actually less than the current capacity.  
The offshore supply vessel (OSV) market is not a single global market, but more like a series 
of regional markets (ICS, 2011). Vessels can move around in search for work making it 
difficult to give an exact number of vessels in a particular region. In March 2015 the worldwide 
fleet count of PSVs was 2355 vessels (Clarkson’s SIN, 2015). The same fleet amounted to 
1187 in January 2004, having almost doubled the last 11 years. 
3.1 Supply and demand in offshore markets 
The offshore market is characterized by the interaction of supply and demand for services. The 
freight rates reflect, at any point of time, the balance between the supply and demand for 
offshore supply vessels. Alizadeh and Nomikos (2011) suggest the following short term 
supply-demand framework for dry bulk shipping freight rate determination:  
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Figure 3.1 Short Term Supply and Demand Framework, Alizadeh & Nomikos 
(2011) 
 
Although Alizadeh and Nomikos (2011) studied the dry bulk market, these findings can be 
transferred to the offshore market. As the authors explain, demand is somewhat inelastic while 
the supply of shipping services has a convex shape due to the limitation of supply at any point 
in time. In the long term the supply curve can shift to the right when new vessels are delivered 
and to the left when vessels are scrapped. The convexity of the supply curve creates a supply 
function, which is, as shown in the figure above, elastic at low freight rate levels (FR1, Q1 to 
FR2, Q2) and very inelastic at very high freight rate levels (FR3, Q3 to FR4, Q4). Causing this 
shape of the supply curve is the excess supply of vessels when the market is in a trough. This 
occurs when vessels are unemployed, laid up and freight rates are very low. When these market 
conditions occur in the offshore supply market, a demand shock, for example bad weather or 
a huge oil spill, can be met by the excess fleet capacity and lead to rather low freight rate 
fluctuations.  
If the market strengthens on the other hand, fewer vessels are unemployed or laid up. At the 
point of full utilization of the fleet, any additional supply increase in the short run is to bring 
in vessels from other offshore markets around the world or to reduce days in port. In such a 
scenario, the supply curve converges to a vertical line and becomes very inelastic.  
Subsequently, a change in demand would lead to considerable change in the freight rate. 
The major demand driver for OSVs is the oil price and the worldwide demand for oil. A long-
term and sustained increase in the oil price together with increased worldwide demand for oil 
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makes it more attractive for oil companies to increase their production and exploration. 
However, as big projects also have a long lead time, it might take some time before an 
increased oil price will result in a higher demand for vessels (ICS, 2011). 
Different offshore installations have different needs. Installations are usually separated into 
two types of units. Units moving around in search of oil and gas are called exploration or 
drilling rigs. Oil and gas producing units staying in the same position for an extended amount 
of time are called production platforms. Drilling rigs have a more uncertain demand than 
production platforms in general due to lower visibility. The supplies and stores needed to 
operate the platforms are to some extent predictable well into the future. It allows the oil 
companies to somewhat accurately calculate their yearly need of offshore supply vessels (ICS, 
2011). To exemplify; two platforms installed 143 nautical miles ashore and spaced 26 nautical 
miles apart require 1500 tonnes of cargo every three days. If the oil company hires PSV vessels 
that are 3200 dead weight tonnes and sails in 13 knots, the two installation would tie up exactly 
two PSV vessels, which visits the installations every 2,5 days, in order to fulfil the cargo 
requirements (Adland, 2014b) 
Exploration rigs’ required support is a function of many factors. Most importantly is the 
distance from onshore to offshore location. As vessels more or less travel at the same speed, a 
rig closer to shore ties up fewer vessels than a rig further ashore. Other factors include the type 
and number of wells being drilled as well as the availability of vessels.  
3.2 Spot and term contracts 
The duration of a charter determines whether the contract is a spot, medium or long-term 
charter. A fixture with duration of less than 30 days is usually considered as a spot charter. 
Medium term is considered to be a fixture between a month and a year while a fixture longer 
than a year is considered to be a long-term charter. The freight rate is paid in arrears monthly 
for term contracts or upon redelivery in the spot market. The charterer pays for port costs, 
cargo dues, loading, discharging and fuel. Fuel tanks of vessel and cargo are shared between 
the ship-owner and charterer. The ship-owner pays for lube oil and other operating costs such 
as crew and insurances. Long term charters are concluded after a competitive tendering 
process to find the optimal vessel. 
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Spot charters are much simpler and fast paced compared to term chartering. Shipbrokers run 
the spot chartering process while the charterer makes the final vessel decision (Adland, 
2014b). Spot contracts are usually fixed only a few days before start of operations and are re-
negotiated every day. This means that today’s freight rate isn’t necessarily equal to tomorrow’s 
freight rate, for a given contract. The North Sea has the only well-functioning spot market in 
the world today. 
The spot market is well-functioning for the oil companies when there exist a permanent pool 
of available vessels waiting for charter. Excess supply of vessels in the spot market will result 
in low freight rates. For it to be well-functioning for a ship-owner, reasonable demand must 
exist in order to make it attractive for a ship-owner to have his vessel lying in a port with hopes 
of securing regular short-term employment. Even though ship-owners and oil companies have 
opposing interest it can be argued that some overcapacity in the market is beneficial. Norman 
(1980) suggested an economically efficient equilibrium for the tanker market where the value 
of one extra transport unit should be at least as valuable as the cargo value. Consider Norman`s 
equation   
𝑃 (𝑘`)  ∙ 𝑣 = 𝑏 
where P (k) is the probability of too little capacity with fleet size k, v is the value to an oil 
company of one extra transport unit when transport capacity is scarce. Lastly, b, is the cost 
of providing one unit of transport capacity. The cost of transporting is generally lower than 
the cargo value, which implies that b/v is low and gives us an indication on how often we 
should expect to have overcapacity and a low freight rate environment.  
Several ship-owners choose to have a large part of the fleet secured on long-term contracts 
and use the remaining vessels to play the spot market and take advantage of periods with 
excess demand and high day rates. The term charter market is a place where ship-owners and 
charterers allocate freight market risk according to their risk preference. The benefit of a long-
term fixture is a predictable income stream. The downside is the risk of being paid a lower 
freight rate than one can achieve in the spot market. For a ship-owner, spot rates need to exceed 
long-term rates to compensate for days lying in port without work. There may be several 
reason to why ship-owners choose to operate their vessels in the spot market when term charter 
freight rates are higher than spot freight rates. It can be in hope of an increased spot freight 
rates, not being able to obtain a long-term charter or due to risk preferences.  Oil companies 
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will look at their required need for support and supplies to conduct their operations, and charter 
enough vessels on long-term charters to cover their anticipated daily needs. They will 
generally look to the spot market in the case of increased activity level, bad weather, oil spill 
or other demand shocks (ICS, 2011).  
Building a vessel is a trade-off between a specialized and standardized vessel. Building a 
specialized vessel requires some certainty of a long-term charter.  A vessel built on speculation 
for the spot market is usually a standardized vessel capable of performing services in several 
regions to a wide range of clients. If charterers prefer newer vessels on long-term charters it 
may influence the quality of vessels available in the spot market.   
3.3 Term structure 
3.3.1 Term structure in shipping and offshore markets 
The relation between freight rates for comparable contracts, which differ only in duration, is 
called the term structure (Veenstra, 1999). It reflects the market’s expectations about future 
spot freight rates and a time-varying risk premium (Strandenes, 2014). As Berg-Andreassen 
(1997) points out, the relationship between spot and term charter freight rates is of great 
practical importance for all stakeholders in the dry bulk market. A ship-owner can either 
charter out his ship on term contracts or a sequence of spot contracts, where the duration adds 
up to the term charter period. The ship-owner chooses the alternative with the highest present 
value after he has discounted it with his personal discount rate and risk preferences. In the dry 
bulk market, a considerable amount of speculators operate in the spot market. Hence, every 
arbitrage possibility are taken advantage of. This mechanism forces the term charter freight 
rates to eventually equal the present value of the expected spot freight rates. If one were to use 
the so called liquidity preference model, the market players requires an extra premium for 
taking a long-term contract to offset the loss of liquidity (Beenstock and Vergottis, 1993). 
Veenstra (1999) assumes this liquidity premium to be constant over time when he estimates 
his present value model. When using informal tests he finds that the present value model 
support the existence of a term structure.  
When expectations show mean reversion, high freight rates are expected to fall and low freight 
rates are expected to rise. Strandenes (1999) assumes that market participants have semi-
rational expectations, i.e. they have an opinion of the direction of the mean reversion process, 
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but not the actual path and models the term structure as a weighted average of the time charter 
equivalent of the spot rate and the long run equilibrium freight rate. Consider Strandenes’ 
(1999) formula: 
𝑡𝑐𝑖,𝑑 =  𝛾𝑖,𝑑𝜋𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖,𝑑𝜋𝑖       ∀𝑖, 𝑑 
where  is the weight of voyage result  (time charter equivalent, TCE).  is the weight of 
long-term  for equilibrium TCE  bar. 𝑖 is the type of vessel 𝑖 = t,b and d is the duration of 
time charter; < 1 year, 1-3 years, > 3 years. The importance of current conditions is reduced 
when the duration of the contract increases. The weight for the current freight rates  is high 
for time charter contracts of short duration compared to the weight for long-term equilibrium 
freight rate . Hence the term structure can be modeled as presented in the figure below. 
Figure 3.2 The Term Structure, Strandenes (1984) 
 
Although the PSV market differs in some ways from the dry bulk we assume that the term 
structure theory from the dry bulk market can be transferred to the offshore market. According 
to shipbrokers, vessels on term charter contracts have a tendency to be unnoticed by all other 
charterers than the current client because the spot market also function as a “showcase” where 
charterers can gain experience with different vessels and their ship-owner. Having a vessel on 
a long-term contract can therefore be regarded as a liquidity loss for a ship-owner.  
Freight rate fluctuations are primarily due to changes in demand due to fixed supply in the 
very short run. Demand can’t always be predicted perfectly and leads to a periodic mismatch 
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with fleet size and increased volatility. Freight rate expectations may become self-fulfilling if 
all parties expect spot freight rates to increase next week, for example due to bad weather 
forecasts. Ship-owners would hold back vessels in anticipation of higher freight rates while 
charterers would want to fix vessels prior to the increased freight rates. The outcome is a rise 
in demand, decreased supply of vessels, and a higher spot freight rate today (Strandenes, 
2014). This is probably the main reason why we can observe long periods of increasing or 
decreasing freight rates.  
Kavussanos and Alizadeh (2002) discuss whether the term- and spot freight rates are related 
through the expectations hypothesis of the term structure (EHTS). According to the 
expectation hypothesis, time charter freight rates in a particular period should reflect the 
weighted average of spot freight rates in the same period. This is, however, based on the 
assumption that freight markets operate efficiently. Although the efficiency of the PSV-market 
will not be tested in this thesis, we do not believe that the market is efficiently enough for the 
expectations hypothesis of the term structure to be true. 
Based on Kavussanos and Alizadeh’s (2002) paper we can assume that time charter freight 
rates are a type of forward rates. Consequently, we can construct a forward curve with our 
dataset by comparing spot- and term charter freight rates with different durations. Hence, we 
can characterize whether the market is normal, in contango or backwardated. Contango occurs 
when the spot freight rate is below the term charter freight rates. Conversely, backwardation 
exists when the spot freight rates are higher than the term charter freight rates.  
Not being able to hire a vessel can become very costly for oil companies. The costs of 
temporarily shutting down or postponing work on a platform are enormous. Therefore, if a 
platform is dependent on supply from a vessel to continue its work, an oil company’s 
willingness to pay is extremely high. One can compare the historical spot- and term charter 
freight rates with the commodity markets to analyze the forward curve. Backwardation in 
commodity markets occurs when there exists a shortage of the commodity for immediate 
delivery. Hence, a temporarily price premium may occur, as buyers’ willingness to pay for the 
commodity increases with the shortage of the commodity. This happens in the offshore supply 
industry when there is shortage of available vessels combined with high seasonal demand or 
bad weather. On the other hand, markets are in the long term likely to mean revert (Strandenes, 
1984) offering a discount in prices as the market converge to its long term equilibrium. 
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Transferring this to the offshore supply market, one can compare the convergence to contango 
in the commodities markets with more available vessels in the offshore supply market.  
As shown in Figure 3.3, the market was in backwardation from 2004 and throughout 2008. 
Contrariwise, the market shifted to contango in the aftermath of the financial crisis.   
Figure 3.3 Average Yearly Freight Rates 
 
We find the point of intersection in January of 2009 as quite interesting. In chapter 6 we have 
analyzed and compared the period before and after 2009 in relation to our hypothesis regarding 
vessel specifications, contract characteristics and macroeconomic variables. The point of 
intersection is also visible in Figure 3.4, where the spot- and term charter freight rates are 
displayed as monthly averages.  
Berg-Andreassen (1997): “Although normally not always well articulated in the shipping 
industry, the spot rate is assumed to impact the prevailing expectations of term charter freight 
rate movements”. Even though there exists several studies of the term structure in the tanker- 
and dry bulk markets, such studies are of no existence in the offshore supply market as far as 
we know. This shortfall may be explained by lack of sufficient data. However, as Berg-
Andreassen (1997) points out, “the most common shipping industry perception is that the 
changes in the spot rate are the basis for the formation of the expectation of the term charter 
freight rates”. Zannetos (1966) found that the spot freight rate is an important determinant of 
the term charter freight rate. To quote Zannetos (1966): “In summary, the long-term freight 
rates are expected to move in the same direction as the short-term rates, but will not exhibit 
the erratic fluctuations of the spot rate”.  
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Figure 3.4 Average Monthly Freight Rates 
 
By studying Figure 3.4, one can see some of the same relation as Zannetos (1966) mention in 
his book; the term charter freight rates are moving in the same direction as the spot freight 
rate. However, the unpredictable spot freight rate fluctuations are not as present in the term 
charter freight rates. One can also notice that the spot charter freight rate fluctuations are quite 
extreme in the period from 2004-2009 and less volatile from 2009-2015. This may be caused 
by the ship-owners’ aggressive contracting of new vessels in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, hence the supply curve shifted to the right in the latter period.  
3.3.2 The term structure as a credit spread 
The term structure theory of freight rates has some of the same characteristics as the term 
structure theory of interest rates. Hale and Vanags (1989) base their studies of the relationship 
between term- and spot charter freight rates to be similar as the relationship between the long- 
and short term interest rates in the financial markets. The authors modified the bond model 
found in Shiller (1979) and found that the variations in a one year term charter contract should 
be a function of the spread between long- and short term freight rates. In the figure below, we 
have constructed the relative spread between term- and spot charter freight rates in the period 
from 2004 to mid-march 2015.  
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Figure 3.5 Monthly Term and Spot Charter Spread 
 
As Figure 3.5 illustrates, the spread has been quite extensive, varying between positive 300% 
to negative 400% in the examined period. It is worth mentioning that Hale and Vanags (1989) 
points out that the expectations theory did not hold for the dry bulk market in early 1980’s.  
3.3.3 Risk premium in the term structure? 
Kavussanos (1996) compares the risk premiums between spot- and term charter freight rates 
in the dry bulk market between 1973 and 1992. He observed that the volatility, in general, was 
higher in the term charter market than in the spot market. The author argues that term charter 
freight rates may be more sensitive to changing perceptions as they reflect the future market. 
When the market is in a trough and the charterers are sensing an upcoming upturn, they rush 
to fix vessels on term charter contracts. Consequently, the time charter freight rates move 
upwards more rapidly compared to the spot charter freight rates. Conversely, if the market is 
peaking, charters would urge to fix vessels on spot charter contracts. Hence, the shortage of 
demand for time charter contracts results in a sudden decrease in time charter freight rates.  
 
Comparing Kavussanos’ (1996) findings to the offshore supply market, one can’t state that the 
volatility in the term charter market is greater than in the spot charter market. Referring to 
Figure 3.4, we can observe that the volatility of the spot market freight rates are greater than 
the term charter freight rates’ volatility. To picture this even further, we calculated the standard 
deviations from the monthly average spot- and term charter freight rates between 2004 and 
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mid-march 2015. As shown in Figure 3.6 below, the standard deviations in the spot market 
exceeds the ones in the term charter market over the whole period. However, since the summer 
of 2014, when the oil price decreased substantially, the standard deviations in the two markets 
have plummeted and converged towards each other. The standard deviations also converged 
towards each other during the financial crisis in 2008/2009, which might imply that spot- and 
term charter freight rates’ standard deviations are converging when the market is in a trough. 
We find these converging events as very interesting and believe them to be natural ends of a 
cycle; hence we will analyze and compare the periods in chapter 6.5.  
Figure 3.6 Monthly Average Standard Deviations 
 
3.4 Vessel characteristics 
Vessels used are generally divided into two groups: Platform Supply Vessels and Anchor 
Handling Tug Supply vessels. They have some main characteristics that separate them from 
each other. A PSV vessel is predominantly designed to transport cargo to and from an offshore 
installation. In order to ensure continuous production and exploration offshore, the platforms 
and rigs need to be supplied by PSVs on a regular basis. The single most important property 
of a PSV is its carrying capacity. Supplied cargo can be separated into deck cargo, which is 
cargo transported on the deck of the vessel, and bulk cargo transported in the tanks below 
deck. Deck cargo can be drilling pipes or food. Bulk cargo can be drilling mud, water and 
other fluids needed to produce or drill for oil and gas. Supply vessels do not only transport 
cargo to installations but carries return cargo like empty containers and dirty drilling mud back 
to shore. 
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Installations are usually visited by a PSV a few times a week. Oil companies try to serve 
several installations using the same vessel in order to obtain good utilization of the vessels. 
Especially when installations form a cluster it becomes cost-effective to share a vessel.  
An AHTS vessel is designed to anchor, tow and move drilling rigs from one location to 
another. These vessels also have a clear deck area and on-board tanks for fluids. Therefore 
they may in some situations be used as substitutes for PSVs. However, they do not compete 
under normal market conditions. The most important properties of an AHTS vessel are its 
bollard pull (BP) and brake horsepower (BHP).  
The development of both AHTS- and PSV vessels has been incremental over the last decade. 
Due to more ultra-deep-water (UDW) drilling and drilling in harsh environments, the demand 
for larger and more powerful OSVs has increased. Harsh weather conditions in the North Sea 
and Brazil as well as offshore activities taking place further ashore makes the supply of 
installations very demanding. Newer vessels are often multi-functional, weather adapted and 
capable of carrying a variety of cargo in more segregated tanks. A trade-off is present when 
deciding how to configure a fleet. Economies of scale exists when using larger vessels while 
a fleet of many smaller ships is more flexible under demand shocks (Adland, 2014a). 
3.5 Charter dates 
Two important dates exist in a vessel contract. The fixture date is the date on which the contract 
negotiations between the ship-owner and charterer are finalized. The second date is the date 
on which the vessels must present herself ready to start operations. Once the startup day for 
the supply operation has been determined by the charterer, he will enter the market to find the 
most suitable vessel for the work to be conducted. The length of the laycan period may vary 
with the scope of work, geographical area and the supply and demand conditions in the market. 
Assuming vessels are available at all times, the charterer can wait until the last minute before 
hiring a vessel. This is likely to happen if conditions are not favorable and the charterer still 
has time to wait before operations start. The charterer’s decision of when to charter a vessel 
depends on current and expected market conditions, the volatility of rates and risk of having 
to pay excess freight rates if supply is inelastic.   
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4. Model 
In order to investigate the term charter freight rates determinants, the following general model 
is implemented:  
FR = (vessel specifications, contract specifications, macroeconomic variables)             (1) 
where FR is the freight rate for the term contract, vessel specifications are vessel specific 
properties, contract specifications are contract specific characteristics and macroeconomic 
variables are broader variables thought to indirectly influence the freight rate. 
The following model is specified to test the relationship between anticipated determinants and 
the freight rate: 
FRi,t = β0 + β1M2i + β2BHPi + β3DWTi + β4DP2i - β5AGEi - β6DURATIONi +  
β7DAYSFORWARDi  - β8PRODi – β9DRILLi + β10BRAZILi + β11OILPi + β12SPOTi + 
β13WORLDOILPi             (2) 
where FRi,t is the freight rate of the ith fixture (contract) at time t. M2i is the size of the deck 
area measured in square meters. BHPi is the vessel’s brake horsepower. DWTi is the vessel’s 
carrying capacity measured in deadweight tons. DP2i is a dummy variable distinguishing 
between vessel with dynamic positioning system 2 or not. AGEi indicates the age of the vessel 
at the fixture date. DURATIONi is the length of contract i at the fixture date. 
DAYSFORWARDi is the length of the period from the fixture date to start date. The dummy 
variable PRODi is identifying whether the scope of work is production support or not. DRILLi 
has the same function as PRODi except it is drilling support in this case. The dummy variable 
BRAZILi is identifying if the fixture is in Brazil or the North Sea. Furthermore, to control for 
macro determinants of freight rates in the model, we have included the monthly average spot 
freight rate, SPOTi, which serves as an indicator for the condition in the PSV freight market. 
OILPi is the price if one barrel of Brent crude oil at the fixture date. WORLDOILPi is the 
worldwide monthly oil production at the fixture date.  
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4.1 Model arguments 
The inspiration for the model specification was primarily Alizadeh and Talley’s (2011) paper. 
Some of the same micro determinants are included in our model. We have added other micro 
and macro variables believed to be significant determinants of the term charter freight rate.  
As previously mentioned, a PSVs carrying capacity is its single most important property. 
Charterers’ demand may fluctuate, which makes deck area flexibility valuable to the oil 
companies. In the case of bad weather, one can’t fully load a vessel with cargo because of 
safety regulations. Thus, a vessel with a large deck area may be able to fulfil the charterer’s 
supply requirements. A larger deck area entails the opportunity to carry more cargo which 
implies economies of scale for both the charterer and the ship-owner. Offshore installations 
also demand more supplies than previous years due to their technological development. On 
the other hand, installations have limited storage capacity, hence vessels may not always 
utilize a large deck area. Obtaining carrying capacity for bulk cargo has not been successful. 
However, we find it reasonable to assume that a larger deck area implies a larger bulk cargo 
carrying capacity. We suspect deck area and DWT to have a high positive correlation, but 
decided to include both in the model considering that they differ somewhat in what they 
measure. Deck area is a vessel’s storage area while DWT is the carrying capacity in tons. 
Consequently, we believe that increased deck area and DWT is positively related to the freight 
rate. 
Engine size is believed to positively influence the rate. A stronger engine is capable of 
performing more complex operations in a reliable and safe manner in line with the oil 
companies’ strict health, safety and environment requirements. The risk of accidents or 
injuries is assumed to be lower with larger engines because of their capability to withstand 
harsher environments. Aas et al. (2009) suggest that the biggest bottleneck in upstream 
logistics is the vessels ability to safely conduct operations in big waves. We suspect there to 
be a high correlation between BHP, deck area and DWT, but given that they measure different 
vessel features we decide to include all specifications in the model. 
DP-class is included in the model as we believe charterers value a higher DP-class in the same 
way they value brake horsepower. A higher DP-class is able to sustain harsher weather 
conditions much like BHP. We expect there to be some correlation between them. We also 
expect there to exist high negative correlation between DP-class and vessel age as increased 
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DP-class has come with time. However, many older vessels have upgraded their DP-class to 
meet charterers’ requirements.  
Vessel age is expected to be a significant determinant of term charter freight rates. Specifically, 
we expect newer vessels to be compensated for satisfying charterers’ requirements in terms of 
environmental friendliness, safety and efficiency. Hence, the vessel age coefficient is expected 
to have a negative impact on the term charter freight rate.  
We expect the contract length to be negatively related to the freight rate. A longer contract 
provides a secure and predictable cash flow and should make the ship-owner willing to accept 
a lower daily freight rate. However, Veenstra (1999), argue that there exists a constant liquidity 
premium in the term charter freight rates due to the loss of liquidity for the ship-owner. As 
discussed earlier, shipbrokers claims that vessels on long term charter contracts may be 
forgotten by charterers as they are not active in the spot market.  
Predicting number of days forward’s influence on the freight rate is not straightforward, but 
will be interesting to explore. Alizadeh and Talley (2011b) find a positive relationship between 
the laycan period and the freight rate. They believe it suggest that there is a premium when 
hiring a vessel early. This might also be the case in PSV market. On the other hand, we suspect 
the last vessel out of port to achieve a higher freight rate if it is the last available vessel. 
The dummies for scope of work is inspired by Alizadeh and Talley’s (2011b) route dummy 
variables. In the same way tanker freight rates may vary with the routes, PSV freight rates may 
vary with the scope of work. We expect vessels on production support to receive significantly 
lower freight rates than other scopes of work. As previously mentioned, the need for 
production support is quite predictable into the future and vessels are often fixed on long-term 
contracts. These vessels are often standardized vessels capable of performing basic operations.  
Vessels on drilling support are expected to receive higher freight rates than vessels on 
production support, but lower freight rates than vessels on other scopes of work. Drilling 
contracts are often based on a well-by-well basis, making them shorter in duration than the 
production contracts. Drilling contracts may also consists of more uncertainty as it is harder 
for oil companies to estimate the need for cargo transportation to an offshore drilling rig.  
Freight rates are expected to be higher in Brazil due to stricter local laws and legislation which 
makes it costly to operate a supply vessel in the region. The inflation in operational costs, taxes 
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and stricter laws started in the late 2000’s. It is important to mention that although we expect 
freight rates to be higher in Brazil, it does not necessarily mean higher earnings for the ship-
owner. On the other hand, freight rates in the North Sea are believed to be affected by the high 
cost level in the region. As ICS (2011) states: “the cost varies significantly from country to 
country and region to region, to the extent that is becomes almost impossible to define a unified 
worldwide rate level for a particular class of OSV”. The environmental conditions are 
somewhat different between the two regions. Weather conditions are generally worse in the 
North Sea while Brazil has more demanding UDW drilling.  
We are confident that the price of oil will prove to be a significant determinant of the freight 
rate, but are curious to find out to what degree. As previously mentioned, an increased oil price 
is likely to increase oil companies’ oil production and demand for vessels. This is expected to 
increase the freight rates. 
The freight rate is obviously related to the general average monthly PSV rate. As discussed in 
chapter 3, the freight market shifted from backwardation to contango in January 2009. We 
believe the term charter freight rates to reflect the underlying trend and expectations in the 
freight rates. The spot freight rate is expected to be a measure of the current temperature in the 
market. The spot freight rates are expected to have a positive relationship with the term charter 
freight rates. The magnitude of the influence is uncertain and may be time-varying. 
In addition, as a macro variable, the worldwide monthly oil production is included in the 
model. We find it natural to believe that an increased production and exploration of crude oil 
should lead to higher demand for offshore supply services and vessels. The higher demand, all 
else equal, implies higher term charter freight rates until the demand-shock is offset by 
increased supply. We suspect the worldwide monthly oil production to be positively correlated 
with the crude oil price.  
4.2 Method 
To perform the analysis we will apply the information we have obtained to estimate a function 
which may determine the freight rate. To explain the effect different variables have on the 
freight rate we will avail ourselves of OLS regression analysis. Based on the results we will 
have empirical evidence which either supports or rejects our assumptions of the freight rate 
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determination. Six primary regression assumptions need to be met in order to make our model 
applicable.  
1. Linearity - There should be a linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. 
2. Independence of errors - The error terms are uncorrelated with each other. No 
autocorrelation or serial correlation. 
3. Homoscedasticity - The residuals variances is constant over the regressions surface, i.e. the 
variances along the line of best fit remain similar as you move along the line. No 
heteroscedasticity. 
4. No multicollinearity - No independent variable has a perfect linear relationship with any of 
the other independent variables. 
5. The independent variables are uncorrelated with the error term. 
6. Normality - Errors should be normally distributed. 
Tests for these assumptions will be carried out after the regressions in order to assess the 
validity of our input and findings. 
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5. Data 
The data used in this analysis was not obtained from a public database. The data originates 
from a database created and shared only by shipbrokers and oil companies. As several oil 
companies and shipbrokers were excited by our thesis topic, we were allowed access to the 
database. The data contains fixture information from the period January 2004 to March 2015. 
As previously stated, we have chosen to analyze PSV term charter freight rates. Each fixture 
in the sample includes information such as vessel characteristics, scope of work, charterer and 
ship-owner. A significant share, 500, of the fixtures was omitted due to lack of a freight rate. 
The emittance of these fixtures may lead to some faulty conclusions. However, these fixtures 
are evenly spread out through the analysis period, and between various charter parties and 
regions. Due to this we do not expect that the emittance of these fixtures will lead to any 
invalid results. Two fixtures were omitted because of their short contract durations clearly 
classifying them as spot fixtures. We also merged some fixtures since some clients changed 
names during a contract period which made one unique contract appear as two separate ones. 
For example, StatoilHydro changed name to Statoil during the examination period. After 
filtering the data for missing freight rates and double observations we were left with 1187 
fixtures for our analysis. Specifically, the information on each contract includes vessel name, 
work region and country, activity, client, manager, fixture date, start date, end date, US dollar 
rate, brake horsepower and deadweight tonnage. A fragment of the raw data can be found in 
Appendix 1. We also added year built, oil price, deck area, DP-class, monthly worldwide oil 
production and monthly average spot PSV freight rate to each fixture in the sample as we 
believe these variables may impact the determination of the freight rates. 
5.1 The freight rate 
The term charter freight rate is the dependent variable in our analysis. It is expressed as the 
day rate to be paid from the charterer to the ship-owner. Most freight rates in our data have 
been agreed in US dollar. Even though some contracts have been agreed in Pounds Sterling 
(GBP) and Norwegian Kroner (NOK), all freight rates in our data are expressed in USD. The 
currencies were converted to USD before we received the data by using the exchange rate on 
the fixture date. Figure 5.1 shows the exchange rates development between USD and NOK, 
and USD and GBP. As they have moved within the same spectrum we will not do any 
additional adjustment to the data.   
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Figure 5.1 Relative Currency Change, NB (2015) and GV (2015) 
 
5.2 Independent variables 
In order to investigate the determinants of term contract freight rates we have included both 
micro- and macroeconomic variables. Microeconomic variables are captured through vessel 
and contract specifications. Macroeconomic variables are added to describe market conditions 
and sentiment. 
Vessel specifications: 
 Deck area 
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 Scope of work 
-0,15
-0,1
-0,05
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0
1
.0
1
.2
0
0
4
0
1
.0
6
.2
0
0
4
0
1
.1
1
.2
0
0
4
0
1
.0
4
.2
0
0
5
0
1
.0
9
.2
0
0
5
0
1
.0
2
.2
0
0
6
0
1
.0
7
.2
0
0
6
0
1
.1
2
.2
0
0
6
0
1
.0
5
.2
0
0
7
0
1
.1
0
.2
0
0
7
0
1
.0
3
.2
0
0
8
0
1
.0
8
.2
0
0
8
0
1
.0
1
.2
0
0
9
0
1
.0
6
.2
0
0
9
0
1
.1
1
.2
0
0
9
0
1
.0
4
.2
0
1
0
0
1
.0
9
.2
0
1
0
0
1
.0
2
.2
0
1
1
0
1
.0
7
.2
0
1
1
0
1
.1
2
.2
0
1
1
0
1
.0
5
.2
0
1
2
0
1
.1
0
.2
0
1
2
0
1
.0
3
.2
0
1
3
0
1
.0
8
.2
0
1
3
0
1
.0
1
.2
0
1
4
0
1
.0
6
.2
0
1
4
0
1
.1
1
.2
0
1
4
0
1
.0
4
.2
0
1
5
R
el
at
iv
e 
ch
an
ge
Year
Sum of GBP/USD
Sum of NOK/USD
 31 
 Region 
Macroeconomic variables: 
 Oil price 
 Average monthly spot freight rate 
 Worldwide oil production 
Deck area was added manually to each fixture using additional databases provided by the 
shipbrokers. It is measured in square meters and is very important property for PSVs. Figure 
5.2 displays the deck area development of built vessels the past 15 years and the order book 
in the coming two years. It shows an upward trend in the average deck size of new buildings. 
The average deck area lied between 600m2 and 800m2 up until 2010, but has consistently been 
above 800m2 since then.  
Figure 5.2 Deck area development 
 
Brake horsepower is the measure of the vessel’s engine power.  
Deadweight tonnage is the measure of the weight in tons the vessel can carry. It includes all 
cargo, fuel, supplies, and passengers. It does not include the weight of the vessel.  
Dynamic positioning (DP) is a computer system used to automatically maintain a vessels 
position over the ground or relative to another moving unit by using its propellers and 
thrusters.  The system uses position sensors, motion sensors, and wind sensors. The DP class 
can be 0, 1, 2 and 3 where quality increases with the number. The DP-class does also indicate 
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a vessel’s ability to operate in harsh weather. A vessel with DP2 can operate safely in 
significantly harsher weather and wave conditions than a vessel with DP1. Only a few vessels 
in our study does not have a DP-system, all of which are old vessels. As it is a necessity for 
offshore vessel to have a DP-system today, all new buildings have a DP-class. Figure 5.3 
illustrates the amount of vessels built with the different DP-classes each year. It appears that 
close to all new buildings the past decade are equipped with DP2. 
Figure 5.3 DP development 
 
Year built was added manually to each fixture using additional databases. Year built has been 
generalized by assuming that each vessel, on average, was delivered in the middle of the year, 
i.e. 1. July. For each fixture, the difference between year built and fixture date equals the vessel 
age.  
The contract length is measured in days from start to end date. Term charter contract durations 
can be anywhere between 4 weeks and a decade. 
Number of days forward is measured as the difference between the fixture and start date. It is 
the length of the period from the contract is fixed until the contract starts. It can be anything 
from zero days to several years.  
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Vessels are hired to perform various duties. The most pronounced scopes of work are 
construction support, drilling support and production support. There are also other scopes of 
work such as spill response, well stimulation, firefighting, standby and seismic support. 
The region in our study is either Brazil or the North Sea. 270 fixtures are in Brazil and 917 are 
in the North Sea.  
As stated in previous chapters, the oil price is the single most important demand driver for 
supply vessels. We obtained the monthly average Europe Brent Spot Price/barrel from EIA 
(2015a). The monthly average oil price in the fixture month was added to each fixture. 
We used our data sample of all spot PSV fixtures to create a monthly average for each month 
in our analysis period. We added the corresponding monthly average spot freight rate to the 
fixture date.  
The worldwide oil production was added to our data from EIA (2015b). The variable is 
measured in standard cubic meters. 
5.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1 Correlation Matrix 
 
 
TC FR M
2
BHP DWT DP2 Age Duration Days Forward Production Drilling Brazil Oil Price Monthly Spot Oil Production
TC FR 1
M
2
0,27 1
BHP 0,24 0,71 1
DWT 0,25 0,87 0,69 1
DP2 0,24 0,39 0,40 0,36 1
Age -0,17 -0,02 -0,30 -0,31 0,47 1
Duration 0,00 -0,01 -0,05 -0,07 0,06 -0,17 1
Days Forward 0,14 0,10 0,15 0,12 0,05 -0,25 0,52 1
Production -0,23 0,03 0,07 0,03 0,05 0,05 -0,02 -0,15 1
Drilling 0,06 0,01 -0,06 0,04 0,03 -0,15 0,07 0,10 -0,78 1
Brazil 0,11 -0,34 -0,31 -0,29 0,14 0,01 0,57 0,26 -0,15 0,16 1
Oil Price 0,37 0,13 0,08 0,11 0,14 -0,06 0,06 0,05 -0,11 0,10 0,17 1
Monthly Spot 0,30 -0,09 -0,08 -0,07 0,10 0,07 -0,04 0,06 -0,01 0,06 -0,16 -0,13 1
Oil Production 0,08 0,22 0,21 0,20 0,18 -0,05 0,00 0,02 -0,04 0,08 0,12 0,50 -0,39 1
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5.1 displays the correlation between our variables. Table 5.2 displays the descriptive 
statistics of our data. The average freight rate in our sample is 24.274,5 USD. The maximum 
freight rate is given to a vessel on a half-year contract in the North Sea in the latter part of 
2007. The second highest freight rate was 15.000 USD lower, indicating that it was a 
particularly high freight rate. Referring to Figure 3.1, we can relate these few observations 
with high freight rates to a very inelastic supply curve and charterers’ willingness to pay. 
 The lowest rate of a mere 5.586 USD per day was given on a two month contract in the North 
Sea at the end of 2009. In fact, the three lowest freight rates is separated by less than 200 
dollars a day and are all contracts in the North Sea in the latter months of 2009 with durations 
of less than 2 months. These rates clearly indicate that the end of 2009 was a bad period for 
ship-owners. Comparing this to the low freight rate level today, Idun Viking was on 31st of 
January 2015 awarded 5.799 USD/day for a term contract with duration of 49 days. This may 
indicate that the freight rate level today is similar to the level in 2009. The currently low freight 
rates are primarily due to excess capacity of vessel available, the oil price drop and Petrobras’ 
corruption scandal. Referring to Dagens Næringsliv (2015), Rem Vision was fixed on a spot 
contract with Statoil for 7 days and a freight rate of 19.950 NOK or 2.535 USD using the 
current exchange rate. This is far below the vessels crew- and operational costs. According to 
Rem Offshores’ financial director, they accepted this low freight rate to state an example that 
the market players will ruin each other if the current market conditions continue.  
The average age of ships when they are fixed is exactly 7 years old. Vessels are spread evenly 
throughout all ages. Some vessels are fixed before they are built. It usually takes around two 
years to build a vessel for the offshore market. However, 15 observations in our sample are 
fixed between 3 and 5 years before they are delivered. All of these vessel, except one, are fixed 
Stats TC FR M
2
BHP DWT Age Duration Days Forward Oil Price Monthly Spot Oil Production
Mean 24275 802 7374 3871 7 610 91 85 24453 415017
Median 23666 820 6690 3800 5 259 21 82 20967 411821
Max 91667 1270 15791 7620 32 3836 1878 133 73482 454951
Min 5586 200 2250 951 -5 28 0 31 5579 386605
SD 9833 178 2318 961 8 733 210 25 14264 13837
SD / Mean 0,41 0,22 0,31 0,25 1,08 1,20 2,32 0,29 0,58 0,03
Skewness 1,10 -0,37 0,60 0,04 1,22 1,65 4,39 -0,11 1,03 0,82
Kurtosis 6,17 2,82 2,91 3,91 3,93 5,25 26,12 1,82 3,65 3,18
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on 8-year contracts with Petrobras working either with drilling support or spill response. It 
suggests that these vessels are built particularly for this work in close cooperation with the 
client, Petrobras. Obviously, the number of days forward is extremely high for these vessels 
as well. Vessel age is also negatively correlated with number of days forward and contract 
duration, indicating that younger vessels are fixed earlier and on longer contracts than older 
vessels. Average number of days forward is 3 months, but the median of 21 days indicates that 
the mean is highly influenced by some new buildings. We can observe that age is negatively 
correlated with all vessel specifications. In other words, when vessel age increases, vessel 
specifications such as deck area and BHP decreases. The interpretation of this is that vessels 
has grown in size and become more modern and able to perform operations in more demanding 
environments.  
Contract durations vary from 10,5 years to the shortest possible term contract of 28 days. The 
average duration of 610 days is significantly higher than the median, 259, indicating the same 
thing as above; the average is highly affected by some extremely long contracts while the 
majority of the contracts lasts less than a year. If we look at the correlation matrix in Table 
5.1, it is interesting to see that number of days forward correlates with the duration of the 
contract. The interpretation of this is that longer contracts are planned more ahead as these are 
supposed to cover the base needs for services. Contract duration does not seem to be much 
affected by vessel specifications. However, contract durations are on average much higher in 
Brazil compared to the North Sea.  
Figures in Table 5.3 show that the average contract length in Brazil is close to 4 years while 
the average duration in the North Sea is just over a year. A positive relationship does also exist 
between Brazil and number of days forward which is expected when there is a positive 
relationship between age and region and age and number of days forward. 
Table 5.3 Contract Durations 
 
Descriptive statistics of vessel specifications shows that vessels vary greatly in size. As 
expected, the correlation matrix shows a very close relationship between the different vessel 
specifications. Between them, deck area, DWT and BHP have a high correlation. We expect 
Brazil North Sea
Average # of days 1378 384
Average # of years 3,77 1,05
Median # of days 1461 178
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at least one of the variables to be insignificant after observing the correlation coefficients. 
There is a minor correlation between vessel specifications and number of days forward 
suggesting that larger vessels are fixed earlier. A clearer relationship can be seen between 
vessel specs and the work region. Operations in The North Sea tend to require larger vessels 
on average compared to Brazil. This might be due to the more demanding weather conditions 
one can encounter in the region.  
The oil price has fluctuated considerably the last decade. The peak was reached in the summer 
of 2008, just before the financial crisis hit the world economy. Even though the oil price fell 
dramatically during the recession, it rose back towards the same high levels in the spring of 
2011 and 2012 and have stayed above 100 dollars/barrel until September last year. The lowest 
oil price took place in the beginning of our research period and just after the financial crisis.  
The average spot freight rates in the PSV market are slightly higher than the average term 
freight rates. We find it very interesting to see that the lowest term charter freight rate is almost 
exactly the same as the lowest monthly average spot freight rate. 
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6. Analysis and findings 
Our findings will be presented and discussed in this chapter. We will start by presenting the 
regressions results of the model specified in (2). Thereafter we will present a semi-logarithmic 
model and try to arrive at an optimized model. A similar analysis of the periods 2004-2008 
and 2009-2015 will be conducted to investigate any differences in the time periods. A 
discussion of the findings will be carried out at the end. 
6.1 Regression results 
Table 6.1 Linear Regression 
 
Table 6.1 displays the regression results of the model specified in (2). What immediately 
strikes is the fact that 11 out of 13 variables are significant on a 5% level, which is considerably 
more than we expected. The R2 tells us that 46,88% of the variation in the freight rate can be 
explained by the variables in the model. The two determinants who proved to be insignificant 
are DWT and number of days forward. This was expected after observing the correlation 
between DWT and deck area in chapter 5. Also, we were unsure if there would prove to be a 
significant relationship between the freight rate and Days Forward. 
N 1187
F (13, 1173) 79,63
Model 5,376,E+10 13 4,136,E+09 Prob > F 0.0000
Residual 6,092,E+10 1173 51932449 R2 0,4688
Adjusted R2 0,4629
Root MSE 7206,4
TC FR Coefficient Std. Err t P>|t|
M
2
12,67 2,64 4,79 0,000 7,48 17,86
BHP 0,51 0,14 3,66 0,000 0,24 0,78
DWT 0,22 0,47 0,46 0,646 -0,71 1,14
DP2 1642,15 543,94 3,02 0,003 574,95 2709,35
Age -125,74 34,39 -3,66 0,000 -193,21 -58,28
Duration -2,00 0,40 -4,95 0,000 -2,80 -1,21
Days Forward -0,39 1,24 -0,31 0,754 -2,83 2,05
Production -7769,25 700,99 -11,08 0,000 -9144,67 -6394,02
Drilling -6362,41 736,18 -8,64 0,000 -7806,78 -4918,03
Brazil 7711,20 695,42 11,09 0,000 6346,80 9075,60
Oil Price 130,82 9,87 13,25 0,000 111,45 150,20
Monthly Spot 0,27 0,02 16,54 0,000 0,24 0,30
Oil Production -0,04 0,02 -2,32 0,021 -0,08 -0,01
Constant 16070,73 7688,53 2,09 0,037 985,93 31155,52
[95% Conf. Interval]
Source SS df MS
Total 1,147,E+11 1186 9,67,E+07
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All other vessel specifications are estimated to be significant determinants of the freight rate. 
The signs of the coefficients are also in line with our assumptions, except Oil Production. The 
interpretation of the coefficients is that a one unit increase in deck area and BHP will increase 
the freight rate with 12,67 and 0,5 dollars respectively. The DP2 dummy indicates that vessels 
with DP2 receive higher freight rates than vessels with DP1 or no DP-class. Freight rates also 
appear to decrease when the age of the vessel increases.  
Contract specifications are estimated to significantly influence the freight rate. As expected, 
the freight rate decreases when the contract duration increases. The freight rate paid in Brazil 
is, in this model, estimated to be 7.711 dollars above freight rates paid in The North Sea. 
Production-and drilling support are estimated to receive 7.769 and 6.362 dollars lower freight 
rates compared to the average of other scopes of work.  
All macro variables included in the model are estimated to be key determinants of the freight 
rate. A one dollar increase in the oil price is estimated to increase the freight rate by 131 
dollars. For every dollar increase in the average monthly spot freight rate, the term freight is 
estimated to increase by 0,27 dollars. The oil production coefficient tells us that an increase in 
the worldwide oil production results in lower freight rates. This variable is only statistically 
significant on a 5% level however. 
The coefficient of the constant term indicates that the average reservation freight rate will be 
16.071 dollars if all other variables are zero. It indicates the lay-up freight rate level. However 
it is not possible for all other variables to be zero, e.g. deck area. Also, the constant term is 
barely significant and has a wide 95% confidence interval. 
6.2 Regression diagnostics 
To evaluate the validity of the estimated model we will consider some of the assumptions for 
OLS regression presented in chapter 4.2.  
6.2.1 Test for linearity 
There should, optimally, be linearity between the dependent variable and the independent 
variable. After investigating the relationship between the variables closely, all independent 
variables seem to have close to a linear relationship with the freight rate.   
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6.2.2 Test for heteroscedasticity 
As mentioned, one of the assumptions for regression analysis is homoscedasticity.  Residuals 
can therefore not be heteroscedastic. Identification of heteroscedasticity can be observed 
graphically. This may be carried out by plotting the residuals against the fitted values. A 
pattern in the spread, e.q. in the shape of a cloud of dots becoming wider or narrower when 
the fitted values increase, indicates unwanted heteroscedasticity. The figure below shows signs 
of unwanted heteroscedasticity. It seems that the model have difficulties trying to estimate 
high freight rates. Some of the large residuals may not be explained by the variables included 
in the model due to the inelastic shape of the supply curve when freight rates are high.  
Figure 6.1 Linear Regression - Residual versus Fitted Plot 
 
6.2.3 Test for autocorrelation 
When using time series in regression analysis autocorrelation may be a problem. To test for 
the presence of first-order autocorrelation, we used the Durbin-Watson test. 
 
𝑑 =
Σ𝑡=2
𝑇 (𝑒𝑡 −  𝑒𝑡−1)
2
Σ𝑡=1
𝑇 𝑒𝑡
2  
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Table 6.2 Linear Regression - Durbin-Watson Test 
 
The d-values always lie between 0 and 4. A d-value substantially less than 2 indicates evidence 
of positive autocorrelation. Conversely, a d-value substantially higher than 2 shows evidence 
of negative autocorrelation. The rule of thumb, when using a Durbin-Watson test, is that there 
exist no autocorrelation if the d-value is between 1,5 and 2,5. Our model has a d-value of 
1,742, indicating close to zero autocorrelation. 
6.2.4 Test for multicollinearity 
Linear regression assumes no or little multicollinearity in the data. Multicollinearity may occur 
when the independent variables are not independent from each other. In order to test for 
multicollinearity, we performed a variance inflation factor (VIF) test. It tells us to what degree 
the independent variable correlates with the other independent variables. The variables should 
not have a VIF-score greater than 10 and the 1/VIF should not be lower than 0,05. If some 
variables deviate from this they should be considered removed from the regression model.  
Table 6.3 Variance Inflation Factor Test 
 
Durbin-Watson test
Sum of Squared Difference of Residuals 1,06031E+11
Sum of Squared Residuals 60882169339
Durbin-Watson D-value 1,742
Variable VIF 1/VIF
M
2
5,04 0,19841
DWT 4,66 0,21459
Production 2,79 0,35842
Drilling 2,78 0,35971
BHP 2,36 0,42373
Duration 2,00 0,50000
South America 1,94 0,51546
Oil Production 1,64 0,60976
Days Forward 1,56 0,64103
Age 1,54 0,64935
DP2 1,53 0,65359
Oil Price 1,4 0,71429
Monthly Spot 1,25 0,80000
Mean VIF 2,35
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The VIF test above suggests that multicollinearity may be present when both DWT and M2 
are included. This is in accordance with our expectations after observing the correlation matrix 
and regression results. All other independent variables have satisfying levels of 
multicollinearity.  
6.2.5 Test for normal distributed residuals 
Figure 6.2 Linear Regression - Residual Normality Plot 
 
Figure 6.2 illustrates a normal probability plot for the linear model. A plot like this attempts 
to tell us to what degree the residuals are normally distributed. If the residuals are perfectly 
normal distributed they will follow the linear line and thereby not have any deviations between 
predicted and actual values. The probability of over- and underestimating a value should be 
fairly the same in a good model. As we can see from the plot above, the residuals does not 
appear to be perfectly normal distributed seeing that they do not follow the line perfectly. 
Despite this one can say that the residuals do not appear to create any major issues for the 
model and findings.  
6.3 Semi-logarithmic model 
After considering the regression results and assumption tests we propose a semi-logarithmic 
model to examine the freight rate elasticity: 
LogFRi,t = β0 + β1M2i + β2BHPi+ β3DP2i – β4AGEi – β5DURATIONi – β6PRODi – 
β7DRILLi + β8BRAZILi + β9OILPi + β10SPOTi + β11WORLDOILPi       (3) 
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We transform the original linear model to semi-logarithmic as the interpretation of the 
coefficients improves. Coefficients do now show relative changes in the freight rate. This 
provides an improved and more logical interpretation of the determinants. Regression results 
from the semi-logarithmic model are presented in Table 6.4. R2 has increased from the 
previous model to 0,50 indicating that the model is slightly better at explaining the variation 
in the freight rate. A one unit increase in the vessel properties deck area, BHP and DWT are 
estimated to increase the freight rate by 0,055%, 0,002% and 0,001% respectively. DWT is 
insignificant in this model as well. Whether a vessel has DP2 or not is estimated to influence 
the freight rate by 6,36%. A one year increase in vessel age is estimated to lower the freight 
rate by 0,6%. If the contract duration increases by one day, the estimated effect on the freight 
rate is a 0,006% reduction. Number of days forward is still found to be insignificant and has 
very little effect on the freight rate. Both production- and drilling support are estimated to 
produce lower freight rates compared to other scopes of work. Conversely, freight rates in 
Brazil are estimated to be 30,5% higher compared to the North Sea. If the oil price were to 
increase by one dollar, the freight rate is estimated to increase by 0,65%. A one dollar increase 
in the average monthly spot freight rate is predicted to increase the term freight rate by 0,001%.  
Table 6.4 Semi-logarithmic Regression 
 
N 1187
F (13, 1173) 90,23
Model 100,592 13 7,738 Prob > F 0.0000
Residual 100,588 1173 0,086 R2 0,50
Adjusted R2 0,4945
Root MSE 0,29284
TC FR Coefficient Std. Err t P>|t|
M
2
0,00055 0,0001 5,09 0,000 0,0003 0,0008
BHP 0,00002 5,63E-06 3,41 0,001 8,17E-06 3,03E-05
DWT 0,00001 1,91E-05 0,68 0,498 -2,46E-05 0,0001
DP2 0,06363 0,0221 2,88 0,004 0,0203 0,1070
Age -0,00603 0,0014 -4,32 0,000 -0,0088 -0,0033
Duration -0,00006 1,34E-05 -3,70 0,000 -0,0001 -2,8600E-05
Days Forward -9,06E-06 0,0001 -0,18 0,858 -0,0001 0,0001
Production -0,28654 0,0285 -10,06 0,000 -0,3424 -0,2307
Drilling -0,22242 0,0299 -7,44 0,000 -0,2811 -0,1637
Brazil 0,30484 0,0283 10,79 0,000 0,2494 0,3603
Oil Price 0,00647 0,0004 16,12 0,000 0,0057 0,0073
Monthly Spot 0,00001 6,65E-07 16,32 0,000 9,55E-06 1,22E-05
Oil Production -1,6E-06 7,86E-07 -1,97 0,049 -3,09E-06 4,00E-09
Constant 9,41150 0,3124 30,12 0,000 8,7985 10,0245
[95% Conf. Interval]
Source SS df MS
Total 201,180 1186 0,170
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Model assumption tests can be found in the appendices. After changing to the semi-
logarithmic model, the d-value in the Durbin-Watson test drops to 1,554. Although the d-value 
is lower in the semi-logarithmic model, the d-values is still within the rule of thumb range, 
signifying close to no existence of autocorrelation. 
The plot of the residuals shows no sign of heteroscedasticity. The VIF test produce the same 
results as the linear model since the independent variables have not changed. The plot for 
normal distributed residuals below has the same interpretation as in the linear model. 
All in all the semi-logarithmic model seem to provide a better fit and interpretation of our 
data. We will continue to use this specification of the model in the remaining parts of our 
analysis. 
6.4 Model optimization 
In Table 6.5 we have excluded one variable at a time. We always exclude the most insignificant 
or least significant variable. Therefore, we started by excluding Days Forward from the semi-
logarithmic model. 
From the results in column [2] we observe no change in R2. We also see that the exclusion has 
had limited effect on the remaining coefficients. Following this we removed DWT, the only 
insignificant variable from [2]. The elimination of DWT led to relatively small changes in the 
remaining coefficient’s values. However, Oil Production is no longer significant on a 5% level, 
and led to the removal of the variable. The freight rate determination model has been optimized 
in [4] when all variables are significant on a 1% level All variables in regression [4] are 
statistically significant on a 1% level, and both the coefficients and R2 is approximately the 
same as in the original semi-logarithmic model. The optimized model consists of 10 vessel-, 
contract- and macro specific variables and is able to explain near half of the variation in the 
PSV term charter freight rates the past 11 years. 
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Table 6.5 Model Optimization Regression 1-4 
  
Curious to see the effect each variable has on the freight rate we continued to remove 
variables from the model. The regression results can be found in Appendix 3.1. Worth-
mentioning results from this process is that M2, Brazil, Oil Price and Monthly Spot alone 
explains 41,4% of the variation in the term charter freight rate. We find it interesting that 
these 4 variables, from all defined determination categories, explains the variation in the 
freight rate to such an extent. 
  
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Variables TC FR TC FR TC FR TC FR
M
2 0.000547*** 0.000546*** 0.000601*** 0.000594***
(5.092) (5.092) (8.403) (8.314)
BHP 1.92e-05*** 1.91e-05*** 1.98e-05*** 1.85e-05***
(3.412) (3.414) (3.593) (3.383)
DWT 1.29e-05 1.29e-05
(0.677) (0.678)
DP2 0.0636*** 0.0639*** 0.0628*** 0.0602***
(2.879) (2.902) (2.859) (2.744)
Age -0.00603*** -0.00599*** -0.00617*** -0.00636***
(-4.318) (-4.346) (-4.559) (-4.706)
Duration -6.08e-05*** -6.21e-05*** -6.22e-05*** -5.99e-05***
(-3.702) (-4.195) (-4.202) (-4.054)
Days Forward -9.06e-06
(-0.180)
Production -0.287*** -0.286*** -0.284*** -0.287***
(-10.06) (-10.20) (-10.18) (-10.27)
Drilling -0.222*** -0.222*** -0.220*** -0.223***
(-7.435) (-7.456) (-7.427) (-7.541)
Brazil 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.299***
(10.79) (10.79) (10.80) (10.65)
Oil Price 0.00647*** 0.00647*** 0.00646*** 0.00611***
(16.12) (16.14) (16.13) (17.12)
Monthly Spot 1.09e-05*** 1.08e-05*** 1.09e-05*** 1.13e-05***
(16.32) (16.42) (16.47) (18.19)
Oil Production -1.55e-06** -1.55e-06** -1.53e-06*
(-1.967) (-1.974) (-1.952)
Constant 9.411*** 9.414*** 9.409*** 8.812***
(30.12) (30.17) (30.16) (138.9)
Observations 1,187 1,187 1,187 1,187
R-squared 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.498
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6.5 Time period analysis 
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 drew our attention to the intersection between average spot- and 
term freight rates observed in the year-end 2008/2009. It made us want to examine if freight 
rate determinants have changed during our analysis period. A stepwise regression is performed 
where variables are excluded by their level of significance. The regression results can be found 
in the appendices. 434 observations are analyzed from 2004-2008 and 753 observations from 
2009-2015. Table 6.6 displays the optimized models for all periods where all variables are 
significant on a 1% level. 
The quite high R2 of 0,62 for the first period could be explained by the number of observations. 
However, we interpret it to be due to the differences in data variation between the two periods 
examined. The coefficient of variance (standard deviations/mean) in the descriptive statistics 
in the appendices shows greater variations in the first period for all variables except Oil 
Production. Also, referring to Figure 3.6, the variations in the spot- and term charter freight 
rates were greater in the backwardated market from 2004-2008 compared to the contango-
market in the latter period.  
Worth-mentioning findings from the first are that the contract duration is one of the most 
significant variables along with the monthly worldwide oil production. The findings in the 
latter period appear to be quite similar to the entire period. A more thorough discussion will 
follow in the next chapter. 
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Table 6.6 Optimization Comparison 
 
6.6 Findings discussion 
We find it very interesting and satisfying to see that our model expectations fit well with the 
regression outcome. Most variables are found to be significant determinants of the freight rate 
on a 5% level. Every variable besides Oil Production influence the freight rate in the projected 
way. However, the variable is not significant when the whole period is optimized, and has a 
positive sign in the optimized model from 2004-2008 and negative sign in the following 
period. 
2004-2015 2004-2008 2009-20015
Variables TC FR TC FR TC FR
M
2 0.000594*** 0.000786*** 0.000443***
(8.314) (8.548) (5.656)
BHP 1.85e-05*** 3.78e-05***
(3.383) (6.432)
DWT
DP2 0.0602*** 0.0898***
(2.744) (4.086)
Age -0.00636*** -0.00925***
(-4.706) (-4.913)
Duration -5.99e-05*** -0.000186***
(-4.054) (-7.641)
Days Forward -0.000299***
(-3.254)
Production -0.287*** -0.356*** -0.235***
(-10.27) (-8.141) (-7.336)
Drilling -0.223*** -0.346*** -0.175***
(-7.541) (-7.171) (-5.306)
Brazil 0.299*** 0.336***
(10.65) (14.92)
Oil Price 0.00611*** 0.00382*** 0.00557***
(17.12) (3.874) (11.47)
Monthly Spot 1.13e-05*** 9.96e-06*** 1.24e-05***
(18.19) (9.349) (10.61)
Oil Production 2.32e-05*** -2.58e-06***
(4.316) (-3.399)
Constant 8.812*** -0.109 9.751***
(138.9) (-0.0519) (31.05)
Observations 1,187 434 753
R-squared 0.498 0.620 0.530
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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First of all, the analysis finds there to be no relationship between number of days forward and 
the freight rate when the whole period is analyzed. This was the variable we were the most 
unsecure of, but we were eager to test due to the findings in Alizadeh and Talley (2011b). 
Though, it did show a positive correlation with contract duration in our data and is significant 
on a 1% level in the first period. The sign of the coefficient indicates that increased number of 
days forward leads to lower freight rates. This is opposite of what Alizadeh and Talley (2011b) 
find for the tanker market.  
DWT is also found to not be a significant determinant of the freight rate in any of our 
regressions. This is all in all due to its correlation with deck area. DWT would have proven to 
be a significant determinant if deck area was excluded from the model. This was found when 
experimenting and working with the data, but is not presented in the thesis. M2 is found to be 
the best and most logical determinant of the two.  
Deck area, M2, is found to be a significant determinant of the freight rate in all of our analyses. 
It is one of the three remaining variables in our model optimization attempt, see Appendix 3.1. 
The positive relationship between deck area and the freight rate is in accordance with our 
hypothesis that a vessel with larger deck area receive higher freight rate. All in all it is found 
to be the most important vessel specification. BHP is found to be significant in both the linear 
and the original semi-logarithmic regression analysis along with the DP2 dummy. Increasing 
engine size and DP-class have the anticipated effect on the freight rate. Of the two, only DP2 
is significant on a 10% level from 2004-2008. Both variables are significant from 2009-2015 
on a 1% level. Figure 6.3 shows that freight rates for vessels with DP2 has been consistently 
higher compared to freight rates for vessels without DP2. In accordance with our hypothesis, 
charterers value DP2 higher and are willing to pay for the quality it brings. In low freight rate 
environments the difference in the freight rate is reduced however. The reduced difference can 
be explained by supply and demand balance in the market at the time. When capacity is scarce, 
charterers will outbid each other to charter higher quality vessels and freight rate differences 
arise between DP-classes. When there is excess capacity and low freight rates, a charterer is 
likely to choose a vessel with DP2 first when the difference in costs between a DP1 and DP2 
is minimal. In other words, the DP2 “premium” diminishes in a market trough. 
Dummy variables for scope of work appear to be key determinants of the freight rate. Both 
production- and drilling support achieve significantly lower freight rates than other scopes of 
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work. This is true for all time periods investigated and in accordance with our expectations. 
We consider it to be due to the predictable and standardized nature of these scopes of work. 
Figure 6.3 DP-class' Average Freight Rate 
 
Increasing vessel age is estimated to result in lower freight rates in all of our analyzes, in line 
with expectations. The same can be interpreted about contract duration. Vessels on longer 
contracts appear to achieve lower freight rates. At first, it surprised us is that contract duration 
is one of the most significant determinants in the period from 2004-2008 while being 
insignificant in the following period. However, some explanations to this seem logical. In the 
latter period, by observing the thick order book and excess supply of vessels, charterers may 
have chosen to fix vessels on shorter contracts as they were convinced that they will always 
be able to charter a vessel cheaply. Charterers would not need to charter vessels on long-term 
contracts in this scenario unless they are eager to fix a specific vessel. Also, a high correlation 
between Brazil and contract duration is present in the most recent period and makes it difficult 
for both variables to be significant. We experimented with the data and found contract duration 
to be significant on a 1% level when all variables except the Brazil dummy was included in 
the model.  
The dummy variable for where the scope of work is taking place proves to be a very significant 
determinant of the freight rate. The dummy variable is insignificant in the period 2004-2008 
but is one of the most significant variables from 2009-2015. The explanation for this is the 
same as above; the correlation between the Brazil dummy and contract duration makes it 
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difficult for both variables to be significant at the same time. When experimenting with the 
data, the Brazil dummy is found to be negative and significant on a 1% level in the first period 
when all variables except contract duration is included in the model. However, contract 
duration appears to be the best determinant of the two from 2004-2008 and Brazil appears to 
be best from 2009-2015. 
The significance of the region variable proves our assumption that there are differences in 
freight rates between the regions. We believe the main reason for this to be the fact that costs 
related to operations in Brazil have increased dramatically in the recent period. Figure 6.4 
displays the yearly average term charter freight rates in the North Sea and Brazil. Compared 
to the North Sea, freight rates in Brazil were significantly lower before the costs started rising 
but have been higher from 2008 until today.   
Figure 6.4 Regions’ Yearly Average Term Charter Freight Rates 
 
As expected, the oil price is found to be the most important determinant of the freight rate 
when analyzing the whole period. It is the most significant variable in all regression analyses 
except in the time period 2004-2008, due to the already explained correlation with Oil 
Production. Increased oil price will in general imply increased freight rates. The worldwide 
oil production has an opposite pattern. It is among the least significant determinants in all 
regressions except the first period where it is the most significant variable.  
The monthly average spot freight rate is consistently one of the most significant variables in 
our analyses. The spot has been a leading variable throughout the whole examination period. 
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The correlation matrix and descriptive statistics found in the appendices show interesting facts 
about the periods. The spot freight rate has a correlation of 0,44 with the term charter freight 
rate from 2004-2008 and 0,35 from 2009-2015. This is opposite of what we expected. The 
higher correlation in the former period might imply that the spot- and term charter freight rates 
were more interrelated before the financial crisis. Monthly average spot freight rates were 
36.534 USD/day in the first period and 17.490 USD/day in the last period, while the monthly 
average term charter freight rates were 24.413 USD/day and 24.195 USD/day, respectively. It 
indicates that the spot market has weakened while the term market has remained at the same 
freight rate level. These findings appear to be in line with Figure 3.2. When the market is 
peaking, spot freight rates are substantially higher than term freight rates. The opposite appears 
to be true during a trough. In addition, the variation in spot freight rates is high in a high freight 
rate environment and low during a lay-up freight rate environment. The standard deviations in 
Figure 3.6 display this well, especially when having the freight rates in Figure 3.4 in mind. 
Figure 3.3 captures the underlying trends in Figure 3.4. 
 51 
7. Criticism and further research 
Some limitations and drawback exist to our findings. Some of the limitations within our thesis 
lie in the chosen methodology. An OLS regression may not be the optimal way to analyze the 
data as there might not be a perfect linear relationship between all determinants and the freight 
rate. However, the estimation technique provides quite good results and thereby we did not 
use a more sophisticated approach.  
Much of the limitations lies within the data sample. A concern is that there probably exists a 
large amount of contracts not reported in the data which could indicate that results are not as 
representative as they could be. Yet, we see this as a data limitation problem we cannot 
influence.  
The sample is also a non-consistent time series as there are gaps in the time series with no 
observations. This might be due to lack of reported contracts but is also likely to be because 
PSV term contracts are not fixed on a daily basis. Also, the mentioned freight rate emittances 
in our sample may create disturbing results although these are spread out consistently through 
the sample. A limitation is also present due to our time consuming effort to manually obtain 
parts of the data.   
The original and unique data consists of fixtures in spot- and term market for both PSVs and 
AHTS’. A possibility for further PSV research could be to examine the spot charter freight 
rate determination and compare it to the findings in this thesis. Similar research can also be 
conducted for AHTS vessels. It would be interesting to compare the spot- and term charter 
freight rate determination across vessel types to reveal which similarities and differences exist 
between the markets. We hope that this thesis and our data will encourage others to examine 
the offshore markets further. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this thesis has been to investigate the determinants of PSV term charter freight 
rates. Relevant determinants have been identified to analyze the freight rate. Determinants can 
be separated into vessel specific, contract specific and macro variables. The period examined 
spans from January 2004 to March of 2015. We have also analyzed the period before and after 
2009 to investigate whether the determination of term charter freight rates changed after the 
financial crisis.  
The investigation reveals several important findings. Most variables in the model are found to 
be significant determinants of the freight rate on a 5% significance level. The freight rates are 
found to be determined by a combination of vessel-, contract- and macro specific variables at 
the fixture date. Particularly, the vessel’s deck area and operating region, the oil price and the 
monthly average spot freight rate are found to be the most significant determinants when the 
whole period is analyzed. All of these findings are in line with our hypotheses and may be of 
great value to all market participants. Vessel size and quality have increased during the last 
decades. Larger deck area and BHP implies economies of scale for both the charterer and the 
ship-owner. Chartering an older vessel costs less for the charterer, but increases the likelihood 
of reduced vessel quality. Dynamic Positioning level 2 is considered to be a mark of quality 
and is compensated for. A negative relationship between contract duration and the freight rate 
is in line with the term structure theory. In fact, contract duration stands out as one the most 
significant determinants from 2004-2008. No significant relationship is found between the 
length of the period from fixture- to start date and the freight rate. Production- and drilling 
support achieve significantly lower freight rates compared to all other scopes of work. Freight 
rate levels are found to be significantly higher in Brazil compared to the North Sea, especially 
after the financial crisis. All in all, and in accordance with the hypothesis, the oil price and the 
spot freight rates appears to be the most significant determinants of the term charter freight 
rates.  
The term structure findings appear to comply well with the existing literature and theories. 
Referring to Figure 3.4, Zannetos’ (1966) theory appears to match to the relationship between 
spot- and term charter freight rates in the PSV market: volatile spot freight rates and term 
charter freight rates which moves in the same direction with less volatility. 
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The PSV freight rates term structure can be modelled in accordance with Strandenes’ (1984) 
term structure model. When the market is in contango, spot freight rates are rather low and the 
term charter freight rates are greater. Conversely, when the market is backwardated, the spot 
freight rates are much higher than the current term charter freight rates. In addition, the 
volatility of the freight rates are low during a trough and high during a peak.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1.1 Raw Data Example 
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Appendix 2.1 Semi-logarithmic - Residual versus Fitted Plot 
 
Appendix 2.2 Semi-logarithmic - Residual Normality Plot 
 
Appendix 2.3 Semi-logarithmic - Durbin-Watson Test 
 
Durbin-Watson test
Sum of Squared Difference of Residuals 156,151
Sum of Squared Residuals 100,456
Durbin-Watson D-value 1,554
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Appendix 4.1 2004-2008 - Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.2 2004-2008 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TC FR M
2
BHP DWT DP2 Age Duration Days Forward Production Drilling Brazil Oil Price Monthly Spot Oil Production
TC FR 1
M
2
0,39 1
BHP 0,27 0,68 1
DWT 0,34 0,84 0,65 1
DP2 0,33 0,39 0,42 0,38 1
Age -0,21 -0,26 -0,31 -0,36 -0,48 1
Duration -0,30 -0,06 0,02 -0,07 -0,01 -0,08 1
Days Forward 0,05 0,28 0,31 0,30 0,13 -0,21 0,30 1
Production -0,20 0,03 0,03 0,00 -0,05 0,05 0,20 -0,04 1
Drilling -0,04 -0,06 -0,11 0,02 -0,03 -0,11 -0,17 -0,09 -0,72 1
Brazil -0,26 -0,37 -0,30 -0,35 -0,17 0,16 0,28 -0,05 0,07 -0,09 1
Oil Price 0,48 0,07 0,00 0,07 0,13 -0,09 0,03 0,06 -0,01 -0,07 -0,02 1
Monthly Spot 0,44 0,07 0,06 0,09 0,07 -0,02 0,00 0,16 -0,09 -0,01 -0,10 0,29 1
Oil Production 0,48 0,16 0,07 0,17 0,17 -0,09 0,01 0,10 0,05 -0,09 -0,08 0,78 0,23 1
Stats TC FR M
2
BHP DWT Age Duration Days Forward Oil Price Monthly Spot Oil Production
Mean 24413 769 7020 3717 8 520 84 69 36534 402797
Median 20988 750 6600 3570 5 246 18 62 34457 401872
Max 91667 1220 15791 7620 32 3836 1526 133 73482 414802
Min 7017 200 2400 951 -3 30 0 31 6997 386605
SD 12554 173 2249 901 8 650 181 24 14487 4371
SD / Mean 602,00 8,32 107,93 43,27 0,40 32,20 8,70 1,16 695,41 209,80
Skewness 1,35 -0,42 0,99 -0,12 1,09 2,21 3,82 1,10 0,37 0,28
Kurtosis 5,52 2,89 3,90 4,18 3,29 8,24 20,35 3,59 2,49 2,33
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Appendix 4.4 2004-2008 - Residuals versus Fitted Plot 
 
 
Appendix 4.5 2004-2008 - Residual Normality Plot 
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Appendix 4.6 2004-2008 - VIF Test 
 
 
Appendix 4.7 2004-2008 - Durbin-Watson Test 
 
  
Variable VIF 1/VIF
M
2
4,05 0,24691
DWT 3,97 0,25189
Oil Price 2,71 0,36900
Oil Production 2,67 0,37453
Drilling 2,38 0,42017
Production 2,32 0,43103
BHP 2,15 0,46512
DP2 1,56 0,64103
Age 1,51 0,66225
Days Forward 1,37 0,72993
Duration 1,3 0,76923
Brazil 1,3 0,76923
Monthly Spot 1,14 0,87719
Mean VIF 2,19
Durbin-Watson test
Sum Of Difference Squared Residuals 62,314
Sum Of Squared Residuals 37,974
Durbin-Watson D-value 1,641
 64
Appendix 5.1 2009-2015 - Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Appendix 5.2 2009-2015 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TC FR M
2
BHP DWT DP2 Age Duration Days Forward Production Drilling Brazil Oil Price Monthly Spot Oil Production
TC FR 1
M
2
0,22 1
BHP 0,23 0,73 1
DWT 0,22 0,89 0,71 1
DP2 0,17 0,36 0,38 0,33 1
Age -0,17 -0,21 -0,28 -0,28 -0,45 1
Duration 0,26 -0,15 -0,11 -0,08 -0,11 -0,22 1
Days Forward 0,23 0,02 0,08 0,04 0,00 -0,28 0,61 1
Production -0,25 0,05 0,10 0,06 -0,04 0,05 -0,12 -0,19 1
Drilling 0,17 0,02 -0,05 0,03 0,05 -0,16 0,16 0,19 -0,82 1
Brazil 0,30 -0,41 -0,38 -0,34 -0,21 -0,01 0,66 0,35 -0,22 0,21 1
Oil Price 0,46 0,08 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,01 0,03 -0,16 0,13 0,08 1
Monthly Spot 0,35 -0,08 -0,08 -0,07 -0,08 0,07 0,04 0,07 -0,02 0,04 0,07 0,28 1
Oil Production 0,05 0,18 0,21 0,17 0,10 0,02 -0,11 -0,02 -0,02 0,03 -0,08 0,17 0,05 1
Stats TC FR M
2
BHP DWT Age Duration Days Forward Oil Price Monthly Spot Oil Production
Mean 24195 820 7577 3959 7 662 95 95 17490 422061
Median 24422 844 7026 4000 4 260 23 102 16579 419520
Max 54488 1270 14000 7620 32 2952 1878 126 42280 454951
Min 5586 250 2250 1407 -5 28 0 43 5579 396607
SD 7857 177 2334 984 7 772 225 20 8201 12454
SD / Mean 286,32 6,47 85,00 35,84 0,26 28,12 8,21 0,74 298,86 453,83
Skewness 0,18 -0,37 0,41 0,08 1,27 1,40 4,47 0,62 0,74 0,65
Kurtosis 3,00 2,76 2,58 3,75 4,33 4,26 26,16 2,36 3,26 3,20
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Appendix 5.3 2009-2015 - Regression 1-12 
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Appendix 5.4 2009-2015 - Residuals versus Fitted Plot 
 
 
Appendix 5.5 2009-2015 - Residual Normality Plot 
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Appendix 5.6 2009-2015 - VIF Test 
 
 
Appendix 5.7 2009-2015 - Durbin-Watson Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF
M
2
5,77 0,17331
DWT 5,24 0,19084
Production 3,25 0,30769
Drilling 3,23 0,30960
Duration 2,64 0,37879
BHP 2,47 0,40486
Brazil 2,33 0,42918
Days Forward 1,76 0,56818
Age 1,57 0,63694
DP2 1,48 0,67568
Oil Price 1,17 0,85470
Monthly Spot 1,12 0,89286
Oil Production 1,1 0,90909
Mean VIF 2,55
Durbin-Watson test
Sum Of Difference Squared Residuals 69,074
Sum Of Squared Residuals 45,989
Durbin-Watson D-value 1,502
